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Review - The
Philosophy of Need
by Soran Reader
(Editor)
Cambridge University
Press, 2005
Review by Stan Van
Hooft, Ph.D.
Jan 2nd 2007
(Volume 11, Issue 1)
The essays collected in this volume
derive from a conference held by the Royal
Institute of Philosophy in Britain in
September, 2003. It appears that the
concept of needs has had a checkered history
in philosophy. Perhaps it is because of
philosophy's origins in Plato that needs,
being tied to the body, are seen as less
important than such theoretical entities as
rights or utilities in discussions of ethics and
social philosophy. Philosophers prefer to
speak of meeting 'subsistence rights' or
maximizing utilities when discussing what
our duties of beneficence are in relation to
needy others.
The problem with the concept of
'utility' is that it takes people's preferences
at face value and urges us to satisfy as many
of them as possible without distinguishing
those preferences which are for things
necessary to a dignified human life and those
which are for superfluous things we merely
want. Without this distinction the ethical
demand to maximize utility is too
indiscriminate. According to David Wiggins'
contribution to this volume, this can only
lead to injustices where the preferences of
the many are given priority over the vital
needs of a few.
Of course, just what is to count as a
basic need is in need of some clarification. Is
the drug addict's need for a hit basic in the
same way that anyone's need for food would
seem to be? Both Wiggins and Gillian Brock
address this question and it is also discussed
with reference to Plato and Aristotle in essays
by Christopher Rowe and Soran Reader. The
view that emerges is that a need is
something which is necessary for human
agency. Insofar as agency involves deliberation and choice it requires physical and mental
health, a degree of security, a sufficient level of understanding of what one is choosing
between, and a certain amount of freedom to act. Moreover, one will need some social
relationships to support one in one's action.
For his part, Garrett Thomson speaks of 'fundamental needs,' which are inescapably
necessary conditions in order for a person not to undergo serious harm. A need is
inescapable if it is not based on a desire which the person would be better off not having
(like a need for drugs) but on a desire which is intrinsic to the person. But if needs are based
on desires we seem to be back to the utilitarian's indiscriminate preference satisfaction.
Thomson's solution is to distinguish between desires and the interests that motivate them.
L'erreur de
Descartes (Fr…
Antonio Damasio…
$38.05
Self Comes to Mind:
Construc…
Antonio Damasio…
$19.20
by Antonio Damasio
Self …
by Antonio Dama…
$27.03
Get Widget Privacy
 
Home  Browse Subjects  Search  New Reviews  About Us  Feedback  
Search Amazon.…
 
Review - The Philosophy of Need - Philosophy http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&i...
1 of 3 5/07/2011 11:59 AM
We all have an interest in food, but the food we desire will be relative to circumstances. The
desires are contingent and malleable while the interest is basic. It is this deeper level of
interest and motivation that enjoys objectivity and grounds the harms we can undergo.
Sometimes it might not be good to get exactly what we want. This also allows us to explain
how desires change but continue to express our deeper interests. Interests allow us to
critically evaluate desires. So if fundamental needs are inescapable they must be based on
those of our interests which are also inescapable rather than on our contingent desires.
It will be clear that the concept of needs has ethical and political import. It would
seem intuitive that the fundamental needs of others establish an obligation to provide what
is needed. Sarah Clark Miller addresses this issue from the perspective of an ethics of care.
She explains how the care ethic acknowledges the situatedness and interdependence of
human existence. However, she does not think that the ethics of care can generate a duty to
meet vital needs. For this we need Kant. Given that we are interdependent, no one could
universalize the maxim that they would not help another in need. In this way a Kantian
argument for the duty of beneficence can amplify the ethics of care. If there is such a duty,
then needy people might be said to have a right to assistance.
This raises the issue of subsistence rights. The problem here is that rights are tied to
obligations. But to whom is the obligation to meet the needs of the indigent and poor around
the world to be attributed? Is it enough to say that we all have an obligation not to prevent a
needy person from getting what they need? This seems too weak. Yet the obligation to give
to each needy person what they need is too strong. No one person can achieve that goal. Bill
Wringe's solution is to speak of collective obligations and to suggest that the collective
obligation generated by the subsistence rights of the world's poor can be discharged by
collective action through political institutions.
The issue of human rights emerges in several of the essays with the suggestion that
to discuss global justice in terms of rights is not as helpful as to discuss it in terms of human
needs. Gillian Brock begins her essay with a variation on John Rawls's original position in
which she suggests that the choice made by participants in the original position would not
be for principles of distributive justice but for the principle that basic needs should be met
before any surplus is distributed. She cites empirical research which shows that most people
prefer social arrangements that protect people from serious harms and also guarantee some
basic liberties. Distributive justice is seen by most people as of secondary importance to the
meeting of basic needs.
The fact is that many basic needs are not being met in the world today. This raises
some questions as to how best to articulate the goals that social and political action to create
global justice should take. Essays by David Braybrooke and Sabina Alkire compare the
discourse of needs with Amartya Sen's discourse of capabilities, and suggest that needs
identify a basic level of provision which, because of the necessities that it addresses, is more
fundamental than capabilities. If I might put it in my own terms, perhaps needs are
necessary conditions for human dignity while capabilities are sufficient conditions. Alkire
suggests, however, that it is important that providers of aid and assistance be aware of local
cultural and material conditions and ways of understanding needs. The discourse of needs
can lead to insensitive and oppressive policies (such as China's one child policy).
Accordingly, thinking in terms of capabilities, or the freedom to do things for oneself, can be
preferable. If aid agencies and governments seek to enhance the capabilities of needy
people to meet their own needs justice is more likely to be served.
Underlying such suggestions are deep philosophical understandings of how needs
figure in the social fabric. John O'Neill contributes an interesting historical essay which
discusses Adam Smith and the problem of so organizing society that the needfulness of
some does not lead to their humiliation as receivers of charity. Smith thought that
commercial society provided a form of solidarity between people which honored both their
own initiative and their interdependence. The modern welfare state, on the other hand,
seeks to overcome the problem of humiliation by depersonalizing the giving of assistance by
turning it into a bureaucratic entitlement. The problem with this is that it breaks down social
solidarity.
The concept of needs even contributes understanding to the philosophy of action.
Jonathan Lowe denies that reasons are causes and yet wants to draw a close relation
between reasons and actions such that reasons are necessary if not sufficient conditions for
an action. The argument is that just as facts are truth-makers for beliefs and propositions, so
needs are 'goodness-makers' for actions. Needs support actions in the way that facts support
beliefs. A good action is one which corresponds to need. According to Lowe, needs belong to
a distinct ontological category. The world is not just all that is the case -- it also contains
needs.
While some essays in this collection are less satisfactory than others -- especially
those that summarize the author's own previously published work -- and while the book
contains far too many typographical errors and word omissions, this collection presents
important work in the philosophy of need. I have no doubt that philosophers working in
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social philosophy and ethics need to come to grips with the concept of need, and its
relevance to metaphysics and the philosophy of action also seems compelling. This collection
will be a good place to start.
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